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I. INTRODUCTION

As a unique form of intellectual property, trademarks serve two
primary functions. First, trademarks exist to protect consumer expectations
about products and services.' A trademark should help consumers to
accurately predict the quality of the product they are purchasing regardless
of the actual source.2 Second, trademarks allow owners of businesses to
* J.D. expected 2004, University of Florida, Levin College of Law. I dedicate this Note to
Leanna, my wife-to-be. Special thanks to Professor Thomas Cotter for his guidance in writing this
Note, and to my family for their love and support.
1. Nat'l Color Labs, Inc. v. Philip's Foto Co., 273 F. Supp. 1002, 1004 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
"[A]n unfair competition suit involves the public's interest in protection against deceit as to the
sources of its purchases ... "Id.
2. For instance, while a consumer may not know that Mcllhenny Co. is the manufacturer
of TabascoTM, they can look at the Tabasco trademark and know exactly what they are purchasing
with regard to quality, consistency, taste, smell, and spiciness.
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accumulate goodwill in their products.' Trademarks can accumulate value
for their owner, and are often sold, licensed, and assigned for millions of
dollars.' In many trademark claims, therefore, courts are forced to balance
the owner's rights in the mark and the consumer's interests in the mark.'
In traditional trademark infringement, or forward confusion, a junior user
attempts to use a well-known senior user's mark to sell its product. In this
context, enforcement of the trademark is beneficial to the consuming
public, because it prevents marketplace confusion which would increase
search costs and harm the trademark owner because of his ownership
interest in the mark. However, in reverse confusion, the interests of
trademark owners and consumers are often in tension.
In reverse confusion cases, a junior user (defendant) adopts a mark
already in use by the senior user (plaintiff). However, the junior user
dwarfs the senior user through advertising and other expenditures used to
promote the mark. While the senior user has a "property" interest in
protecting the mark, the public may benefit more from the junior user's
adoption of the mark because they only identify the mark with the junior
user and are not confused by the dual uses of the mark. That conflict is the
focus of this Note. This Note argues that the doctrine of reverse confusion
should be limited to cases in which society does not benefit from the junior
user's use of the mark enough to outweigh the harm to the senior user's
property rights.
II. THE DOCTRINE OF REVERSE CONFUSION
Reverse confusion was first recognized in 1974 in the Tenth Circuit.
Prior to Big 0 Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,6 courts
were hesitant to recognize trademark rights for small senior users. In
Westward CoachMfg. Co. v. FordMotor Co.,7 the Seventh Circuit refused
to recognize the doctrine of reverse confusion when Ford adopted the mark
3. Trademarks involve "the businessman's right to enjoy business earned through
investment in the goodwill and reputation attached to a trade name." H.W. Carter & Sons, Inc. v.
William Carter Co., 913 F. Supp. 796 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
4. See, e.g., BusiNEss WEEK, Aug. 5, 2002. In its annual survey, Interbrand ranked the top
100 brand names in order of value. The top three were Coca-Cola ($69.6 billion), Microsoft ($64.1
billion), and IBM ($51.2 billion). The value of the marks did not include the assets of the
corporation, just the value of the mark as a trademark. In fact, the Coca-Cola mark did not include
Sprite or PowerAde. The survey also estimated that Samsung would spend over $200 million in
2002-2003 improving the value of its trademark.
5. Nat'l Color, 273 F. Supp. at 1004.
6. 561 F.2d 1365 (10th Cir. 1977).
7. 388 F.2d 627 (7th Cir. 1968).
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"Mustang" for its experimental cars in 1962, subsequent to Westward's
use and registration of the mark for use on its trailers and campers! Ford,
ignoring a request by Westward to cease use of the mark, began massproduction of the Mustang in April 1964.' By October 1965, Ford had
spent over $16 million dollars in advertising the Mustang,° typical of the
expenditures in reverse confusion cases. The circuit court employed a
traditional trademark infringement analysis and found that Westward did
not own a strong mark, and therefore found no infringement."'
As critics pointed out, "[f]ailure to distinguish between direct and
indirect confusion often led to seemingly inequitable results."' 2 Ford
adopted Westward's mark with full knowledge that Westward had federal
registration rights to the mark.' 3 Because of the disparity between the two
users of the mark, it was likely that a purchaser of Westward's product
would think that Ford, the junior user, was the source of the product.
Therefore, "[t]aken by itself, this case would allow powerful junior users
to undermine the trademark protection accorded smaller businesses
through sheer economic strength."' 4 That is why a different analysis, a
reverse confusion analysis, is necessary to protect smaller senior users who
properly use their marks. The Tenth Circuit originated this stronger
analysis in Big 0.

8. Id. at 630. Westward used six different marks on its trailers and campers. The Mustang
mark was by far the most popular, used on 865 of 1234 campers sold by Westward from 1960 to
1965. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 630-32. The main focus of the circuit court's analysis was the strength of
Westward's Mustang mark. The circuit court stated that at least 34 products were federally
registered with a Mustang mark and at least 266 registrations using the picture of a horse. Id. at 631.
The circuit court also found that for the period between 1960 and 1965, Westward had only sold
1234 of the industry's over 875,000 trailer and camper units sold. Id. at 630. Furthermore, the
circuit court found the mark was "not a distinctive word ... but [ I a noun of common usage
denoting the wild or semi-wild horses." Id. at 631. Last, the circuit court looked at Westward's
advertising expenses and found that Westward had spent more than $43,000 in advertising in 1964,
nearly double what it had spent in any other year. Id. The circuit court also found no likelihood that
Westward would "bridge the gap" by expanding into automobile manufacturing. Id.
12. Brent Folsom, Reverse Confusion: Fundamentalsand Limits, 12 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISsUES 258 (2001).
13. Id. at 259.
14. Id.
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A. Recognition of Reverse Confusion in the Courts
Reverse confusion began to take shape in 1974, in Big 0. 15 In Big 0,
Goodyear Tires adopted the mark "BIG FOOT" for use on its tires, when
Big 0 had already established common law rights to the mark.' 6 Goodyear
representatives met with Big 0 representatives and Big 0 rejected
Goodyear's offer of money in exchange for permission to use the Big Foot
mark.' 7 Goodyear continued its use of the mark and by August 31, 1975,
had spent nearly ten million dollars on its "massive, saturation
campaign."" Big O commenced a trademark infringement suit against
Goodyear.' 9 At issue was whether Big 0 had an actionable trademark
infringement claim when "Big 0 does not claim nor was any evidence
presented showing Goodyear intended to trade on the goodwill of Big 0
or to palm off Goodyear products as being those of Big 0. "2 The circuit
court held that reverse confusion was an actionable claim under the
trademark laws of Colorado. 2' The Tenth Circuit reasoned that Colorado's
"'policy of protecting trade names and preventing public confusion' as
well as having 'the tendency (of widening) the scope of that protection"'
called for protection against reverse confusion.22 Also persuasive was
evidence of actual confusion presented by witnesses showing they thought
that Goodyear was the source of Big O's tires after seeing the Goodyear
commercials.23 Therefore, for the first time, a circuit court recognized and
enforced the doctrine of reverse confusion in trademarks.

15. Big 0 Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 561 F.2d 1365 (10th Cir. 1977).
16. Id. at 1367-68. At trial, Big 0 had a net value of $200,000.00. Id. at 1367. In 1974,
Goodyear had a net income of over $157 million. Id. The circuit court also stated, "Big 0 did not
succeed in registering 'Big Foot' as a trademark with the United States Patent and Trademark
Office." Id. at 1368.
17. Id.
18. Id. Goodyear kicked off its advertising campaign with promotions on Monday Night
Football. Id.
19. Id.
20. Big 0, 561 F.2dat 1371.
21. Id. at 1372. The applicable law in the case was Colorado trademark law because Big 0
only had common law trademark rights. Id. The Colorado Supreme Court "has consistently
recognized and followed a policy of protecting established trade names and preventing public
confusion and the tendency has been to widen the scope of that protection." Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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B. Characteristicsof Reverse Confusion Cases
24
Since Big 0, most circuit courts have recognized reverse confusion.
Several characteristics are fairly consistent throughout the cases, the most
notable of which is the unpredictable nature of the cases. Much to the
dismay of both parties, it is very difficult to predict the outcome of a
reverse confusion case based on the facts. Rather, the outcome appears to
rely heavily on the arguments of lawyers.25 This unpredictability frustrates
26
settlement procedure since it obfuscates the question of liability.
Another characteristic of reverse confusion cases is that they often
involve large damage awards due to the high sales volume of the
infringer." In Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., the seminal
case on damages in reverse confusion, the circuit court held that in the
absence of bad faith, "[a] reasonable royalty . . . would [ ] accurately
reflect both the extent of [the junior user's] unjust enrichment and the
interest of [the senior user] that has been infringed."28 Therefore, plaintiffs
often receive either a reasonable royalty with or without an enhancement
for deterrence or ten to thirty percent of defendant's profits.29 This
percentage, a "windfall to the [Sands] plaintiff, likely exceeded a typical
licensing fee."3
24. The Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have explicitly
adopted the doctrine of reverse confusion.
25. Compare Westward Coach Mfg. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 388 F.2d 627, 632 (7th Cir.
1968) (stating "the name MUSTANG is not a coined or fanciful name, but a common name") with
Plasticolor Molded Prods. v. Ford Motor Co., 713 F. Supp. 1329, 1334 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (stating
"Ford has long used various arbitrary and distinctive marks to identify its products including
FORD, ... [and] MUSTANG.").
26. Daniel Domenico, March Madness: How Brent Musberger and the Miracle Bra May
Have Led to a More Equitable andEfficient Understandingof the Reverse Confusion Doctrine in
TrademarkLaw, 86 VA. L. REv. 597,624 (2000) ("[t]he variability and unpredictability ofdamages
are also likely to discourage parties from reaching settlements.").
27. See id. at 623. "[A]n award based on even a small percentage of the junior user's sales
can yield very large numbers." Id.
28. Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 963 (7th Cir. 1992). The
circuit court also stated "[iun such a case [where there is no bad faith], an award of $24 million in
profits is not 'equitable'; rather, it is a windfall to the plaintiff." Id.
29. Domenico, supra note 26, at 619-23 (discussing the various calculations of damages).
30. See Sands, 978 F.2d at 963; Domenico, supranote 26, at 622.
As noted by Judge Richard Cudahy, the case for infringement was "thin," and thus the
damage amount came very close to being nothing. Between the three stages of the case, then,
potential liability of Quaker jumped from zero to over forty million dollars, then down to
twenty-six million. Had any one of the four judges changed his mind about the award, the
amount again could have shifted significantly in either direction.
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A third characteristic is that plaintiffs risk little in a lawsuit because of
the nature of damages awarded. The expected value of the lawsuit is
skewed by the opportunity for large damages. Sands was understandably
a large trademark case, with a large plaintiffs verdict. Therefore,
conservatively speaking, due to the types of damages awarded in a reverse
trademark infringement case against a mid-sized company, the plaintiff
could hope to recover, arguendo, ten million dollars in damages. The
median litigation cost of a single trademark case is $502,000. 3' Therefore,
to break even, the plaintiff would only need a slightly greater than five
percent chance of succeeding
on his or her claim to be economically
32
encouraged to bring suit.
It is also important to realize that the development of an infringing
trademark is not always the result of bad faith. In IHSA v. GTE Vantage,
Inc., the use of "March Madness" began when Brent Musberger, a CBS
broadcaster, used the term during a television broadcast of the NCAA
"Final Four" championship game.33 Presumably, Musberger did not have
knowledge of IHSA's trademark and had no intention to infringe on it.
Similarly, in Sands, the circuit court stated that "evidence of bad faith here
is marginal at best., 34 As discussed infra, selection of a mark by an
infringing junior user does not necessarily rely on free riding by the junior
user, but rather sloppy trademark research. Therefore, requiring bad faith
intent would most likely negate the protection afforded under reverse
confusion. However, the harms of reverse confusion somewhat dictate the
level of protection that small senior users should receive.
C. The Harms of Reverse Confusion
Proponents of strong reverse confusion protection often struggle to
identify the specific harms of reverse confusion. As the Ninth Circuit
espoused, "[w]hat could be better for Dreamwerks [a small senior user]
than to have people confuse it with a mega movie studio [DreamWorks
SKG]? Many an infringer has tried to manufacture precisely such

31. 2001 Report of Economic Survey 86 (Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Assoc., Arlington, Va.
2001) [hereinafter 2001 Report].
32. The expected value of any lawsuit is the probability of winning multiplied by the award
won minus the cost of losing multiplied by the probability of losing. With any chance of winning
greater than five percent, the plaintiff has a positive expected value based on projected costs of
around $502,000 and a projected recovery of $10 million.
33. II!. High Sch. Ass'n v. GTE Vantage Inc., 99 F.3d 244, 245 (7th Cir. 1996). GTE was
found not liable for reverse confusion in this case. Id. at 248.
34. Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 963 (7th Cir. 1992).
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confusion and thereby siphon off the goodwill of a popular mark.""
Realistically, a small senior user may see a jump in sales when a large
senior user adopts the same mark and begins promoting the product line.
In addition, the mark is not causing confusion as to the source of the junior
user's good, so it does not fall into the auspices of traditional likelihood of
confusion analysis, where a court would look to see whether consumers
believe that the senior user is the producer of the junior user's goods.36
However, victims of reverse confusion still contend that they are harmed
by the junior user.
One harm of reverse confusion is that it diminishes the value of the
senior user's mark. In IHSA, the Illinois High School Association argued
that GTE's use of the term "March Madness" "impair[ed] IHSA's ability
to make money by licensing its trademark on merchandise and other
incidentals."37 Therefore, CBS's use of the March Madness trademark
destroyed the marketability of the mark for licensing purposes. In the
extreme, "consumers may consider [the senior user] an unauthorized
infringer" on the junior user's mark resulting in injury to the senior user's
goodwill and reputation.3" Similarly, consumers may experience
disappointment when they discover that they are doing business with the
small senior user and not the large junior user.3 9 Therefore, reverse
confusion may elicit a visceral cognitive response from consumers with
respect to the senior user, the proper owner of the mark and can also injure
the economic viability of the senior user's mark.
A second harm associated with reverse confusion is that the senior user
loses its control over its own mark. As the plaintiff in Dreamwerks argued,
"whatever goodwill it has built now rests in the hands of DreamWorks; if
[DreamWorks] should take a major misstep and tarnish its reputation with
the public, Dreamwerks too would be pulled down."4 Additionally, a
35. Dreamwerks Prod. Group, Inc. v. SKG Studio, 142 F.3d 1127, 1129 (9th Cir. 1998).
36. See Big O Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire& Rubber Co., 561 F.2d 1365,1371 (10th
Cir. 1977). "Goodyear argues that the second use of a trademark is not actionable if it merely
creates a likelihood of confusion concerning the source of the first user's product." Id.
37. IHSA, 99 F.3d at 246.
38. Banff, Ltd. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 841 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir. 1988).
39. Harlem Wizards Entm't Basketball, Inc. v. NBA Props., Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1084, 1089
(D.N.J. 1997) ("more than twenty people who attended or expressed interest in attending the
[Harlem Wizards'] fundraiser had thought that the Washington Bullets [later the Wizards] were
playing and not the Harlem Wizards."). This is the type of confusion that can be detrimental to the
senior user.
40. Dreamwerks, 142 F.3d at 1129; see also Amy Doan, Xbox Name May Cost Microsoft,
FoRBEs, Feb. 5,2001, available at http://www.forbes.com/newmedia/2001/02/05/0205xbox.html
(last visited Nov. 21, 2003). The owner of Xbox Technologies, an electronic learning software
company stated "[wie don't want our serious business applications confused with games." Id.
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senior user may lose its ability to expand into new markets.4 ' Therefore,
the senior user is at the mercy of the junior user if the courts refuse to
prohibit thejunior user's use of the mark. While this harm is more abstract
than the economic harm to the senior user's mark, it is very real and
another justification for the enforcement of reverse confusion. In the era
of corporate scandal, one can only imagine the harm that Worldcom's
collapse could have on the reputation of a small telecommunications
company in Albany, Georgia.
The harms of reverse confusion are therefore most notable because they
differ from the traditional harms of trademark infringement. In a typical
trademark case, the consumer suffers from confusion in the marketplace
when there is a likelihood of confusion. The senior user is harmed when
the junior user infringes on the mark and siphons off business from the
senior user, resulting in a loss of business for the senior user.42 As a result,
the infringer is unjustly enriched because it profits from the goodwill
associated with the senior user. Therefore, the harms associated with
reverse confusion are distinguishable from the harms associated with
forward confusion. While the infringer is not reaping any of the benefits
typically associated with trademark infringement, the senior user loses the
significance and distinctiveness of its mark, similar in fact to dilution.43
Finally, while reverse confusion laws provide only the most basic
trademark infringement protection to senior users, they provide protection
in a distinct context and therefore garner considerable theoretical criticism.

41. See Ameritech, Inc. v. Am. Info. Tech. Corp., 811 F.2d 960, 964 (6th Cir. 1987); see also
Dreamwerks, 142 F.3d at 1129 ("Dreanwerks points out (somewhat wistfully) that it hopes to
expand its business into related fields, and that these avenues will be foreclosed if DreamWorks
gets there first.")
42. Big 0 Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 561 F.2d 1365, 1371 (10th Cir.
1977).
43. Antidilution provisions
protect the trademark owner from the erosion of the distinctiveness and prestige of a
trademark caused by the sale of other goods or services under the same name (for example,
the use of "Tiffany & Co." as the name of a hamburger stand, or simply a proliferation of
borrowings that, while not degrading the original seller's mark, are so numerous as to
deprive the mark of its distinctiveness and hence impact), even though there is no confusion
of source.
Ill. High Sch. Ass'n v. GTE Vantage, Inc., 99 F.3d 244, 247 (7th Cir. 1996).

REVERSE CONFUSION IN TRADEMARKS

20031

III. How STRONG

SHOULD REVERSE CONFUSION PROTECTION BE?

Due to the competing interests behind enforcing relatively weak marks
through reverse confusion, scholastic debate centers around how strong
reverse confusion protection should be for small senior users. A great deal
of the discussion centers around whether property rules or liability rules
should be used to protect trademarks." However, this Note will attempt to
apply the fundamental theories used in law and economics as well as moral
rights theories to suggest a balance between the creator's needs and the
needs of the consuming public. This Note will look at the most equitable
and efficient applications of law at the time a lawsuit is likely to take place
rather than the time of adoption or infringement because a legal decision
is more likely needed to resolve a dispute after the initial infringement has
already occurred and consumers have begun to associate goodwill with the
infringing junior user's use of the mark.45 Therefore, a fundamental
assumption underlying these arguments is that the junior user is currently
infringing on the senior user's mark and the mark has value to consumers
in the form of reduced search costs.46
A. Lockean andMoral Rights Theories Applied
Equitable concerns dominate the justifications for protecting small
junior users through strong reverse confusion protection. One of the
44. See, e.g., Domenico, supra note 26, at 629-34 (discussing the various advantages of
liability rules over property rules in determining what is equitable and efficient).
45. See IHSA, 99 F.3d at 247.
Were NCAA responsible for blotting out the exclusive association of "March Madness" with
the Illinois high school basketball tournament, IHSA might have a remedy on a theory of
reverse confusion, though probably not an injunctive remedy since that would promote
confusion among consumers, most of whom now identify the term with the NCAA
tournament
Id.
46. This author believes that this assumption is necessary to properly decide the equitability
and efficiency issues involved in reverse confusion. Case law supports this assumption. See e.g.
Westward Coach Mfg. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 388 F.2d 627,630 (7th Cir. 1968) (where Ford spent
over $16 million promoting its "Mustang" mark prior to suit being brought); A & H Sportswear,
Inc. v. Victoria's Secret Stores, Inc., 237 F.3d 198, 208 (3d Cir. 2000) (where Victoria's Secret
spent over $13 million promoting its "Miracle Bra" mark prior to suit being brought). Under the
fundamentals of trademark law, at the time the infringing mark is adopted, it would be more
appropriate for thejunior user to adopt a non-infringing mark. See Stephen Carter, The Trouble with
Trademarks,99 YALE L.J. 759(1990) (discussing the debate between "irrelevant mark assumption"
where "[o]ne mark is as good as another if not joined to goodwill, and there are plenty of marks
available" and theories that some suggestive marks are more valuable than others, as there are a
finite number of suggestive marks for a product).
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underlying theories of trademark protection is that trademarks are an
incentive to business owners to "produce high-quality goods and services,"
knowing that their competitors cannot mimic their mark and free ride off
of their hard work.4 7 This is consistent with Locke's labor theory, which
' A defensible trademark
posits, "we must provide rewards to get labor."48
does not infringe on an already existing trademark, therefore, it is an
"unclaimed good." A trademark owner takes this mark out of the public
commons and associates a particular product with that mark, making the
word or symbol more useful to the public.49 Therefore, strong trademark
protection encourages investment in a mark and weak trademark
protection discourages investment in a mark. Reverse confusion is merely
a specialized form of trademark protection, which protects the smaller
senior user. Without reverse confusion protection, "a company with a well
established trade name and with the economic power to advertise
extensively [would be immunized from suit] for a product name taken
from a competitor."50 Therefore, the existence of reverse confusion
provides equal trademark protection to all creators of marks, regardless of
their size and provides the necessary encouragement for mark owners to
develop their trademarks.
An analysis under Lockean Theory suggests the junior user should lose
rights to the mark because the senior user has invested time and money in
developing the mark. However, the junior user has done so as well, and in
most cases, has done so without any intention to free ride and often
without knowledge of infringement. Therefore, under Locke's theory, the
junior user is also entitled to the fruits of its labor, which would be
eliminated under strong reverse confusion laws.
Moral rights theories expand on the idea that a creator should have
control over his or her creation. In copyright law, it is often stated in one
way or another that "an author's book is his 'property."' 5 While hotly
debated, laws which restrict subsequent improvements on patents and
copyrights have the de facto effect of conferring rights in the creator to

47. William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property,in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND
POLICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 169-70 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001).

48. Justin Hughes, The Philosophy ofIntellectual Property,77 GEo. L.J. 287, 296 (1988).
49. Fisher, supranote 47, at 170. "By increasing our stock of nouns and by 'creating words
or phrases that people value for their intrinsic pleasingness as well as their information value,' they
simultaneously economize on communication costs and make conversation more pleasurable." Id.
50. A & H Sportswear,237 F.3d at 228 (citing Big 0 Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 561 F.2d 1365, 1372 (10th Cir. 1977)).
51. Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books,
Photocopies,and Computer Programs,84 HARV. L. REV. 281,288 (1970).
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control his or her creation. 2 This same moral rights theory can be applied
to trademarks as the owners similarly must expend effort in developing a
mark before it will be recognized as a defensible trademark. Therefore,
moral rights would dictate a trademark owner's control over uses of its
trademark, which would prevent unauthorized infringement, be it reverse
or forward confusion. Therefore, the natural rights theory could suggest
giving trademark owners strong property rights in their marks and
therefore strong protection against reverse confusion.
The appeal of moral rights is limited in the context of trademarks. In
a traditional sense, although trademarks have some property aspects, they
really belong to the public at large as source identifiers. Unlike copyrights,
trademarks do not equally express the "personality" of the creator.
Therefore, it is likely that harm through trademark infringement is largely
economic and moral rights add little to what Lockean theory already
provides for protecting the fruits of one's labor.
B. Utilitarianismand Economic Efficiency Applied
While many of the arguments in favor of strong reverse confusion
protection are compelling, they find little support in the world of law and
economics. Efficiency concerns dominate the economic analysis of reverse
confusion. The granting of a trademark gives the owner a de facto
monopoly over use of the mark. 3 Therefore, with strong reverse confusion
protection, the owner of a mark can prohibit anyone else from using the
mark even though the mark may be more valuable to an infringer.
One applicable theory of economic efficiency is pareto efficiency. A
system of distribution is said to be "pareto optimal" when there is no
different allocation in which someone is better off without making
someone else worse off. 4 Presumably, the trademark is allocated to the
senior user due to statutory or common law priority. While the trademark
may be more valuable to the infringing junior user, conveying any rights
to the infringer would make the senior user worse off economically as
discussed in the aforementioned harms analysis. Therefore, the current
system of trademark right allocations is said to be pareto optimal, as it is
impossible to make the junior user better off without making the senior
user worse off.
52. See, e.g., Mark Lemley, The Economics ofimprovement in Intellectual PropertyLaw, 75
TEX. L. REv. 989, 1031-32 (1997).
53. Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367, 421 (1999) ("[o]ne
of the rights typically included in this bundle is the right to exclude others from using the mark in
certain contexts.").
54. See RICHARD A. POsNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 1.2 (5th ed. 1998).

JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY LAW& POLICY

[Vol. 8

A second theory of economic efficiency is Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.
Under Kaldor-Hicks, one looks at wealth maximization to decide whether
a transaction will increase the overall wealth within society." If reverse
confusion protection was weak, it would facilitate the transfer of rights to
the junior user. Therefore, the inquiry to determine Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency is whether the benefits of allowing the junior user to infringe on
56
the trademark of the senior user exceed the harm to the senior user.
Under this analysis, consent is irrelevant, but ability to pay is very
relevant." However, because of the inherently large size ofjunior users by
definition in reverse confusion cases, the junior user will normally have
the ability to pay the minimum fee requested by a reasonable and rational
senior user.
There are two beneficiaries from the junior user's infringement on the
senior user's mark. From a property standpoint, the junior user clearly
benefits. At the time a trademark infringement case is brought under
reverse confusion, the junior user has presumably already invested large
amounts of money in developing the mark,"8 since a recurring aspect of
reverse confusion is flooding or saturation of the marketplace with the
junior user's mark. 9 Therefore, it may be economically inefficient to
prohibit the junior user from continuing his use, as it may discourage a
senior user's development of the trademark. 60 The more tenuous but
supportable argument is that the public benefits from the junior user's use
of the mark, especially when there is no bad faith involved in the
infringement. 61 The benefit that consumers derive from the use of
55. Id. § 1.2.
56. See JEFFREY HARRISoN, LAW AND ECONOMICs INANuTsHELL 33-35 (1995).

57. See id. at 34.
58. See supratext accompanying note 46.
59. Thad Long & Alfred Marks, Reverse Confusion: Fundamentals and Limits, 84
TRADEMARK REP. 1, 26 (1994).
60. See, e.g., A& H Sportswear, Inc. v. Victoria's Secret Stores, Inc., 237 F.3d 198,228 (3d
Cir. 2000).
The chief danger inherent in recognizing reverse confusion claims is that innovative junior
users, who have invested heavily in promoting a particular mark, will suddenly find their use
of the mark blocked by plaintiffs who have not invested in, or promoted, their own marks.
Further, an overly-vigorous use of the doctrine of reverse confusion could potentially inhibit
larger companies with established marks from expanding their product lines - for instance,
had Victoria's Secret thought, at the outset, that it would not be permitted [to] carry over its
popular The Miracle Bra mark from lingerie to swimwear, it might have chosen not to enter
the swimsuit market at all.
Id.
61. See Ill. High Sch. Ass'n v. Vantage GTE Inc., 99 F.3d 244, 246-47 (7th Cir. 1996)
("[w]hat matters is that a trademark is not nearly so secure an entitlement as a property right. It is
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trademarks is reduced search costs. Therefore, if a disproportionately large
number of consumers use the infringing junior user's mark to reduce
search costs than use the senior user's mark, then one positive externality
of the junior user's use is reduced search costs. 62 A Kaldor-Hicks analysis
therefore compares the benefits to both the junior user and the consuming
public and the harm to the senior user, as previously discussed. Where the
benefits exceed the harms, which seems to be likely based on the junior
user's investment in the mark, the economically efficient solution is to
allow infringement despite the harm to the senior user and the likelihood
of confusion.
Economic efficiency considerations must also take into account the
deterrence that weak protection will have on the development of marks by
small companies. Considered even further, one would need to determine
whether discouraging small companies from developing trademarks would
have any detrimental effect on society at large. As previously stated, the
harms of preventing future use of the mark by the junior user should be
considered at the time of trial, not at the time of adoption, as the harm to
society of taking a popular trademark out of the marketplace is more
severe than the harm of putting a different trademark into the marketplace
contemporaneous with product introduction. Therefore, it appears that the
economically efficient solution under Kaldor-Hicks, with no consideration
of Lockean principles, is to allow the junior user to infringe on the senior
user's mark.
C. The Coase Theorem Applied
In the day and age of settlements, one might wonder why reverse
confusion cases even make it to court. Empirical evidence suggests that
large infringers are often willing to pay large amounts for trademarks. To
use the name "Explorer" with its web browser, Microsoft paid nearly five
million dollars to a small search company.63 This amount paled in
comparison to the $19.6 million awarded to the plaintiff in Big 0 and the
mainly just a designation of source, [ ]and dies when it ceases to designate, for whatever reason
other than the culpable conduct of the defendant."). In reverse confusion, the "source identifier"
aspect of the senior user's mark is, therefore, often without merit.
62. Trademark scholarship supports the notion that trademarks reduce consumer search costs.
See, e.g., Dennis Corgill, Measuring the Gainsof Trademark Infringement, 65 FORDHAM L. REV.
1909, 1941-42 (1997). "When making repeat purchases of the same kind of product, consumers
often rely upon trademarks and the reputations associated with trademarks. By purchasing the same
brand, consumers strive to assure that they obtain the same level of quality or stylized image with
each purchase." Id; see also supra text accompanying note 45.
63. Doan, supra note 40.
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$26 million awarded to the plaintiff in Sands.64 Since the smaller senior
user presumably lacks capital to develop his trademark, a valuable
exchange may occur where the senior user receives cash and the junior
user receives rights to use the trademark. When voluntary transactions
reallocate the resources to satisfy both parties, the Coase Theorem dictates
the parties will rationally behave to maximize their self-interest in the
absence of high transaction costs.6 5 Some scholars regard the Coase
Theorem as the ultimate compromise between equitable and efficiency
concerns.66 Therefore, the Coase Theorem merits consideration.
Most new companies start small and envision infinite growth.67
Therefore, it is impossible for the Patent and Trademark Office to
determine the extent of future use of a trademark when the office initially
grants use of the rights to the mark under the Lanham Act. When a mark
is federally registered, the senior user should presumably get the initial
allocation of the rights. The primary inquiry, therefore, is whether the
infringer is willing to pay an amount equal to or greater than the lowest
amount the senior user will accept in exchange for the trademark. As
stated above, there is an indication of willingness of junior users to
compensate senior users for their trademarks. In terms of transaction costs,
the fees associated with a licensing or an assignment are legal fees.
Considering the legal fees associated with a trademark infringement case,68
it is reasonable to assume the transaction fees are lower for settling than
for defending a trademark infringement case. Therefore, the Coase
Theorem suggests a compromise between equitable and efficiency
concerns and suggests that junior and senior users will reach an agreement
that benefits all parties involved. The Coase Theorem predicts that strong
reverse confusion protection will forcejunior users to negotiate with senior
users but that an efficient and equitable transfer of rights will occur that
benefits all parties and consumers. The Coase Theorem, with its limited
applicability, seems convincing in this context.
This analysis changes under common law rights. When two companies
are in a trademark dispute over the right to use a mark, perhaps the inquiry
should take into account not only the priority of use, but also the relative
size of the mark. In this context, the junior user would not have to bargain
64. Id.; Big 0 Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 561 F.2d 1365 (10th Cir.
1977); Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 34 F.3d 1340, 1344 (7th Cir. 1994).
65. See Michael Swygert & Katherine Yanes, A Primeron the Coase Theorem: Making Law
in a World of Zero Transaction Costs, 1 DEPAuL Bus. L.J. 1,2 (1998).
66. See Michael Swygert & Katherine Yanes, A Unified Theory of Justice: The Integration
of Fairnessinto Efficiency, 73 WASH. L. REv. 249 (1998).
67. See generally JOHN NESHEIM, HIGH TECH STARTUP (2000).
68. See 2001 Report, supranote 31, and accompanying text.
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with the senior user, but would automatically be assigned rights to the
mark so long as the junior user's use was more beneficial to the public
than the senior user's use. However, one drawback of this approach is that
it obscures the distinction between reverse confusion and forward
confusion. No finite distinction exists between a senior user deserving of
reverse confusion protection and a senior user deserving of traditional
trademark protection. Regardless, the Coase Theorem suggests that the
two parties will be able to find an amicable solution where each party
receives a valuable resource.

IV. CONCLUSION

In any trademark case, there are three parties to consider: the trademark
owner, the infringer, and the public. Trademarks are a distinctive form of
intellectual property because they lack many of the property rights that
copyrights, patents, and trade secrets have. Therefore, the primary
consideration for the application of trademark law should take account of
the benefits to the consuming public.
De facto, most consumers will benefit more from the junior user's use
of the mark than the senior user's use. This is because consumers are either
unaware of the senior user's use or are not confused by the concurrent
uses. Disallowing the junior user to continue use will harm the consuming
public, as they must reorient themselves to the various sources of products,
and as it is not likely that DreamWorks would stop making movies simply
because they lose rights to the name. Rather, consumers would need to be
educated as to the new name of DreamWorks. In addition to increased
search costs, the cost of education would obviously fall on the junior user,
who would pass along the cost to consumers. Therefore, whenever a
reverse confusion case arises, someone must lose something of value.
Under Lockean theory, it seems that the equitable solution is to allow
the senior user of the mark to continue its uninfringed use since it was the
originator of the mark and should be entitled to the exclusive fruits of its
labor. However, economic efficiency realism should temper enthusiasm
for Lockean theory. It is in this context that the property function and
consumer expectations function are in tension. When in tension, the
primary function of trademarks, protecting consumers, should trump the
senior user's property rights in its mark.
Hence, when the Coase Theorem fails to predict some form of
settlement between the parties, the government must step in and speak for
the unrepresented public. If the courts fail to recognize the needs of
consumers and the advantages that trademarks have to consumers, the
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courts will overemphasize the property aspects of trademarks and over
allocate rights to senior users. Therefore, in the interest of protecting
consumers, the law should force the transfer of the trademark from the
senior to the junior user. Ideally, this transfer would be accompanied by
compensation, which would satisfy all parties to some extent while still
protecting the prevailing interest of the consuming public.

